Build for agents
that cross boundaries.

Design for governed participation.

Interagentic separates portable identity from destination-local authority. This developer preview describes a proposed model, not a released protocol or a production authorization service.

Passport → Interagentic → Visa → Place

The Passport describes the agent. The handshake evaluates destination requirements. A destination-authorized Visa scopes participation in a place.

Portable identity, verifiable claims.

Identity claims can include persona, cryptographic key, provenance, owner, sponsor, qualifications, declared capabilities, attestations, reputation, version, and issuance chain. Destinations must choose which issuers and claims they trust.

A permission envelope for a visit.

A Visa binds an agent to a destination, purpose, sponsor, capability set, data boundary, memory policy, delegation rights, economic terms, expiry, and governing policy. It is not an account or a permanent credential.

{
  "schema": "interagentic.protocol-preview",
  "illustrative": true,
  "visa": "ia:v:8F72A",
  "subject": "passport:kade",
  "destination": "polygon:incident-3821",
  "purpose": "incident-response",
  "grants": [
    "conversation.read",
    "conversation.write",
    "siem.query",
    "artifact.create",
    "web.research"
  ],
  "restrictions": {
    "shell.execute": false,
    "data.export": false,
    "memory.persist": false,
    "subagent.spawn": false,
    "agent.delegate": false
  },
  "memory": "session-only",
  "expires": "2026-11-05T16:08:22.479Z",
  "status": "active"
}

Illustrative Visa. Expiry is generated 24 hours from this page visit.

Negotiate before establishing presence.

Present the Passport, verify identity and provenance, declare purpose, request capabilities, evaluate destination policy, apply restrictions, obtain required approvals, and establish a bounded session.

Requested ∩ allowed = granted.

Deny by default. A trusted identity cannot grant itself authority. Capabilities should be checked at each actual tool or data boundary. Purpose and session context may further restrict an otherwise granted operation.

Make participation legible.

Presence links identity to a current location, declared purpose, activity, session, authority, state, and sponsor. Expose only the presence information authorized by destination policy.

Derived authority may only narrow.

Delegation requires explicit permission. A derived Visa must be constrained by its parent, with its own subject, purpose, destination, expiry, and accountability chain. Parent revocation must invalidate dependent authority.

Retention is a permission.

Distinguish session-only use, scoped retention, authorized persistent memory, and restrictions on export. These policies require cooperation and enforceable controls in the runtime and destination; a document alone cannot guarantee forgetting.

Ending a visit ends authority.

An enforcement implementation must check current authorization, terminate sessions, and invalidate dependent grants on revocation or expiry. A signature or long-lived cached token alone does not provide immediate revocation.

Proposed Interagentic API

These paths illustrate an interface design. They are not live production endpoints and the schema is not standardized.

Request entry

POST /v1/entry/request

{
  "passport": "aipp://persona/kade",
  "destination": "syn://incident-3821",
  "purpose": "incident-response",
  "capabilities": [
    "conversation.read",
    "conversation.write",
    "siem.query"
  ]
}

Possible response

{
  "status": "granted",
  "visa": "ia:v:8F72A",
  "expires_at": "2026-11-05T16:08:22.479Z"
}

Proposed endpoints

Production implementations will need issuer trust, signature validation, replay protection, session binding, policy evaluation, revocation, audit controls, and secure transport.

An integration surface, still taking shape.

No public Interagentic SDK is released through this site. The intended adapters will connect identity issuers, agent runtimes, policy engines, destinations, and tool enforcement points.

Follow an incident-response visit.

Kade requests access to an incident-response collaboration. The destination grants conversation, investigation, and artifact capabilities; it denies shell execution, data export, persistent memory, and delegation.